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JENNIFER Hornsby’s 1997 paper, ‘Truth: The Identity Theory’, has 
been highly influential in making the identity theory of truth a viable 
option in contemporary philosophy. In this short introduction and 
commentary I will limit my attention to what distinguishes her theory 
and its methodology from the correspondence theory and the 
‘substantivist’ methodology, and I will focus on issues that  have not 
been widely discussed in earlier commentaries yet are central to the 
current debate on truth.1 By ‘the identity theory’ I will mean ‘Hornsby’s 
identity theory’.  
 
I. Introduction. The identity theory says that a truth-bearer is true if 
and only if it is a fact or is the same as some (appropriate) fact. For 
Hornsby the justification or raison d’être of the identity theory is mainly 
negative: ‘the identity theory arises out of rejection of a correspondence 
theory’ (p. 4); ‘[t]he interest of the theory derives from what it [is] 
opposed to philosophically’ (p. 3); ‘the identity theory is worth 
considering to the extent to which correspondence theories are worth 
avoiding’ (p. 6). The key issue is the relation between truth-bearers and 
reality. The correspondence theory says that there is a ‘gap’ between 
truth-bearers (thoughts) and something external to them which explains 
their truth/falsehood. The identity theory says there is no such gap. 
 
Hornsby could have tried to justify her theory by appealing to its 
avoidance of criticisms like the ‘slingshot’, directed at traditional 
correspondence theories. But although she says in a footnote that the 
slingshot criticism does not apply to her theory, she does not pursue this 
line of justification. She focuses on a more central issue to the 
correspondence theory, namely, whether truth requires a ‘gap’ between 
truth-bearers and reality, and she motivates the identity theory by 
objections, which she attributes to Frege (1918), Quine (1960) and 
McDowell (1994), to the ‘gap’ view.    
 
Frege argued that truth does not come in degrees or ‘respects’; truth 
requires a perfect correspondence between thought and reality, and 
perfect correspondence is coincidence. Hornsby interprets him as saying 
that ‘there cannot be an ontological gap between thought (“an idea”) 
and the world (“something real”)’ (Hornsby 1997, p. 6). Next, she 
                                                            
1 For other contemporary identity theorists, commentators on Hornsby, and Hornsby’s 
responses see, e.g., Candlish (1999), Hornsby (1999), Dodd (1999, 2000), David 
(2001) and Engel (2001).  
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traces the ‘no gap’ view to Quine’s attack on the myth of the museum: 
‘[f]rom the identity theorist’s point of view the correspondents of the 
correspondence theories of truth play the same role as the exhibits in the 
museum of the mind’. Most importantly for the contemporary debate, 
Hornsby traces the ‘no gap’ view to McDowell: 
 
[T]here is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can ... 
think, and the sort of thing that can be the case. When one thinks 
truly, what one thinks is the case .... [T]here is no gap between 
thought, as such, and the world. [McDowell 1994, p. 27]2  
 
The identity theory is concerned with one aspect of the ‘gap’ 
question: whether there is a gap between truth-bearers and facts. One 
distinctive characteristic of the theory is its conception of truth-bearers 
as thinkables, a notion borrowed from McDowell. Thinkables, as 
Hornsby understands them, are neither mental nor worldly entities. They 
are contents of thoughts - entities that may be thought of as located in a 
Fregean realm of sense. ‘The identity theory is encapsulated in the simple 
statement that true thinkables are the same as facts’ (p. 2). By identifying 
facts with true thinkables (= true truth-bearers), the world plays no role 
in what the identity theory has to say about truth: ‘there is nothing 
external to thought [truth-bearers, thinkables] ... in terms of which truth 
can be understood’ (p. 17).      
 
As a theory, the identity theory is anti-substantivist. Among the 
things it is designed not to do are give a definition of truth, analyze 
truth, provide an explanation of truth, look for the sources of truth, say 
anything which is metaphysically contentious, examine what people are 
doing when they investigate reality, and so on. ‘Truth’, according to the 
identity theory, is not a notion of substance that can be used in 
explaining other things. By introducing this notion into our language we 
do not add anything new to it. There is no more to truth than playing a 
certain technical (logical) role. Truth does not provide a new mode of 
evaluating truth-bearers. From the point of the view of the identity 
theory even Horwich’s minimalist theory tries to do too much: ‘to the 
extent that the minimal theorist wants to convey a deflationary message 
about truth, which is not already conveyed in the identity theorist’s 
opposition to correspondence, the message has to be resisted’ (Hornsby 
1997, p. 16). This does not mean that the identity theory is vacuous: it 
takes a stand on what the bearers of truth are and, according to 
Hornsby, it also has resources for saying what people are doing when 
they are using language and for offering an interpretive account of truth. 
But it eschews everything concerning truth that goes beyond speakers 
and truth-bearers.     
 
                                                            
2 Others who connect the identity theory of truth with McDowell (1994) include Dodd 
(1995), Suhm, Wgemann & Wessels (1999), Engel (2001), McDowell (2005) and Fish 
& Mcdonald (2007).   
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Hornsby does not justify her anti-substantivist approach to truth 
beyond pointing to Frege’s (1918) claim that truth is indefinable (which 
is itself justified on the grounds that due to the basicness of truth, a 
definition of this notion is bound to involve circularity or infinite 
regress). Possibly, she also obliquely appeals to McDowell’s reasons for 
recommending quietism in philosophy; possibly, her anti-substantivism 
is rooted in her overall approach to philosophy, which emphasizes 
commonsense over theory. But there is no explicit justification of anti-
substantivism in Hornsby’s paper.  
 
 
II. Commentary. By appealing to McDowell (1994) in motivating her 
theory of truth, Hornsby (along with Dodd 1995) made an original and 
important contribution to the contemporary debate on truth. The reason 
is that the basic problematics of the human cognitive situation that 
McDowell draws attention to is both central to truth and largely 
neglected in the current debate. Hornsby’s weakness is that she limits her 
attention to one element of this problematics, the ‘no gap’ element, 
losing sight of the equally important ‘gap’ element, hence of the 
problematics itself. Let me explain: 
 
McDowell calls for following Kant in recognizing the problematics of 
the human cognitive situation. This situation, as McDowell delineates it, 
is characterized by several polarities: mind and world, friction and 
freedom, concept and object. For true cognition to occur, ‘[h]uman 
minds must somehow be able to latch on to the inhuman structure of 
reality’ (McDowell 1994, p. 77). Now, such a latching on requires two 
elements, a human mind and a world independent of it, hence gap. 
Latching on to the world is bridging or closing the gap (hence no gap). 
Both are essential for true cognition. In true cognition mind must be 
constrained by the external world (gap), but in a way that makes it 
possible for it to use the constraint to generate true cognition as 
distinguished from false one. McDowell’s proposal is that the world, or 
that part of the world that constrains the mind in this constructive 
manner, is thinkable. That is, the constraint involved in true cognition, 
which is rational or conceptual, is itself rational, that is, involves, or is 
mediated by, concepts. Concepts, in turn, require freedom, hence true 
cognition has a substantial element of freedom. More specifically, 
McDowell proposes that concepts play a central role in the mind’s 
latching on to the world all the way. That is, there is no gap between the 
use of concepts in latching on to the world and the use of pure 
perception. The kind of perception that is relevant for cognition is 
already imbued with concepts. This is the more specific meaning of the 
‘no gap’ element in McDowell’s proposal. But McDowell is adamant 
that we must not neglect the crucial role of external constraint in this 
process (hence gap). Constraint by the external world (gap), he repeats 
time and again, is crucial for true cognition. Without it, what we regard 
as true cognition would be a mere ‘spectre of a frictionless spinning in a 
void’ (p. 18). 
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How is this relevant to the theory of truth? It is relevant in two 
directions: (a) The question of truth is central to the cognitive problem 
since the difference between failing and succeeding in latching on to the 
world is the difference between obtaining false and true cognitions. (b) 
The question of cognition is central to truth, since one of the central 
roles of truth is to distinguish between failed and successful cognitions of 
the world (latching-ons to the world), or set a standard for successful 
cognitions. Accordingly, a theory of truth cannot neglect external 
constraint by the world. But this crucial aspect of McDowell’s 
conception is entirely missing from the identity theory of truth. External 
constraint plays no role in this theory.  
 
Another way to arrive at this issue is to observe that if a theory of 
truth puts McDowell’s cognitive problematics at its center, it faces a 
non-trivial challenge: How to account for the truth of human thoughts 
given the enormous complexity of the human cognitive situation. (How 
to account for the fact that true thoughts are products of the mind yet 
their truth is determined by the external world;3 how to deal with the 
polarities involved in the cognitive situation, which pull us in seemingly 
opposite directions.) The problem is further magnified since, as 
McDowell rightly demands, we must avoid the traps of idealism on the 
one hand and a Kantian thing-in-itself / empiricist ‘brute Given’ on the 
other. But the identity theory cannot meet this challenge. First, identity, 
as a gap-denying relation, can play at most a limited role in an account 
involving gaps and non-symmetric relations (like ‘latching on’ to the 
world). Second, given the complexity of the cognitive situation involved 
in truth, it is quite unlikely that a theory as simple as the identity theory 
has sufficient resources to account for it. Third, given the importance of 
the McDowellian problematics for understanding true cognition (truth), 
it requires a substantive treatment, something the identity theory is not 
equipped to provide.4  
 
Hornsby is quite aware of the fact that truth involves an independent 
reality (hence gap); indeed, she regards it as a virtue of her theory that it 
is compatible with commonsense realism. She is also aware that there is 
an important asymmetry in truth (which cannot be captured by identity), 
and that this asymmetry concerns an important aspect of truth, namely, 
that it is reality which determines the truth of our thoughts, rather than 
our thoughts which determine reality (Hornsby 2005, §4). But her 
theory does not account for any of these things, nor do any of these 
things play a substantial role in her theory. Why? I gather this is because 
she realizes that accounting for these characteristics of truth would 
require a substantive theory or truth and, moreover, a correspondence 
                                                            
3 To see that, and how, McDowell views the world as determining the truth/falsehood 
of a particular truth-bearer see his example in (2005, p. 85). 
4 In referring to McDowell’s problematics, I focus primarily on the early lectures in his 
book. Whether any of my critical points applies to any of McDowell’s views elsewhere 
in his corpus I will not be able to discuss here.    
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theory of truth (or something like it), but (i) she is anti-substantivist with 
respect to truth, and (ii) she sees no hope for a correspondence-like 
theory of truth.  
 
The key to understanding the problem with Hornsby’s attitude 
(namely (i) and (ii)) is provided by Hornsby herself. She concludes her 
paper by saying: ‘I have promoted the identity theory, because I think 
that we have to find a position from which to avoid the false dilemmas 
that the theories currently on offer present us with’ (p. 22). To see our 
way into a theory that meets the McDowellian challenge we must free 
ourselves from the false misconceptions and dilemmas that are 
commonly associated with theories of this kind.    
 
Consider correspondence. From the point of view of the basic 
problematics of human cognition correspondence is a relation that 
seriously involves the human mind on the one hand and the world on the 
other, a relation that explains how the world constrains the mind in a 
way that gives rise to true cognition. Now, from the point of view of 
these concerns, whether the basic entities involved in this relation are 
facts or entities of other kinds (say, objects and properties) is a 
secondary, and open, question. But from the point of view of the 
traditional debate on correspondence the question of facts is the main 
question. Viewed traditionally, correspondence requires wholes of one 
kind to stand in some fixed relation to wholes of another kind, and the 
question is which wholes these are? But what Hornsby does not seem to 
see is that from the point of view of the McDowellian problematics the 
question of wholes or facts  is merely scholastic. What we are interested 
in is how the mind latches on to the world to achieve true cognition. 
That is, our investigation is directed at the routes the mind can, does, 
and should, take into the world in order to attain true cognition. And 
this mean that it is an open question whether this route leads from whole 
sentences (whole thoughts) to whole pieces of the world (facts) or 
whether it proceeds by connecting language (thought) to objectual 
elements that are essentially different from facts. But the objections to 
correspondence mentioned by Hornsby do not apply to a (non-
traditional) correspondence theory that does not require facts, a theory 
that investigates the correspondence relation and its relata rather than 
takes them as given.  
 
In a way, Hornsby cannot consider a correspondence investigation of 
this kind, since such an investigation would in all likelihood be 
substantive, but Hornsby objects to a substantive study of truth. 
Hornsby might argue that nonsubstantive theories have some advantages 
over substantive theories. For example, a nonsubstantive theory is more 
“safe” than a substantive theory in the sense that it says very little about 
truth and as such it is unlikely to conflict with most of the true things 
that can be said about truth, hence is unlikely to be found incorrect. But 
is this really an advantage? McDowell is known for emphasizing the 
importance of not confusing justification with exculpation. Saying so 
little about truth that one cannot be wrong about anything substantive 
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concerning it grants one immunity to blame. But what a good theory 
needs is justification. A theory has to say enough so that on the one hand 
it is open to critical examination and on the other hand it teaches us 
something new about its subject matter – here, the structure of truth, 
given the complexities of the human cognitive situation. 
 
Perhaps, however, a substantive theory of truth is impossible. 
Hornsby, as we have seen, points to Frege’s claim that such a theory 
cannot avoid circularity. Is this a decisive objection? I think it is not, and 
the key to understanding why it is not is, following Hornsby’s own 
counsel of freeing ourselves from false dilemmas and preconceptions. 
The view that any measure of circularity is fatal to a theory is tied to a 
specific methodology, foundationalism. The first step in overcoming 
Frege’s objection is recognizing the availability of alternative 
philosophical methodologies, like holism, which sanction some measure 
and forms of circularity (and is, indeed, endorsed by McDowell). 
Holism, however, is traditionally assumed to be a coherentist 
methodology, incompatible with correspondence. The second step is to 
realize the falsity of this assumption. Holism licenses non-linear 
theorizing in principle, and this license can be used in a variety of 
theories, including theories directed at, and grounded in, reality. Holism 
focuses not on the order in which such theories are constructed but on 
the extent to which they contribute to our knowledge of a given subject-
matter. It allows shifts in position within our system of knowledge, 
conceived as a Neurath boat, including shifts involving temporary and 
partial circularity (circularity that can eventually be eliminated, 
circularity that involves only parts of the theory, and circularity whose 
extent can be reduced in later stages of developing the theory). As such, 
it is especially suited to the study of subject-matters like truth. The 
viability of a substantive theory of truth using the holistic method is not 
undermined by Frege who had never considered this possibility.  
 
There is much more to say about the issues discussed in this 
commentary, but my space is limited.5 To clarify my criticism of 
Hornsby’s paper, let me briefly respond to a question raised by Guy 
Longworth. Longworth suggested that there are two ways to understand 
my criticism: (1) The claim is that Hornsby does not provide a 
substantive account of the gap and the asymmetry involved in truth. (2) 
The claim is that her theory does not have the resources to provide such 
an account. My view is that if it is inherent in Hornsby’s approach that 
the Identity Theory is anti-substantivist (as I believe it is), then the 
criticism is (2). If, on the other hand, Hornsby’s conception of the 
Identity theory is compatible with a substantivist approach to truth, then 
the  criticism is (1). In the latter case, the challenge I put to Hornsby is to 
                                                            
5 For more on (non-coherentist) holism, the substantivist approach to truth, and 
‘routes’ of correspondence see Sher (1999, 2004, 2010, 2012, 2013a,b, and 
Forthcoming). 
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provide a substantive account of the gap and asymmetry involved in 
truth, one that is significantly an “identity” account.  
The questions of substantiveness, correspondence, the relation 
between truth and cognition, and the focus of theories of truth are 
important questions that many of the seminal papers published in the 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society bear upon. The identity theory of 
truth falls on one side of these issues; I support the other. I hope that the 
problematics I focused on in these comments will stimulate a fruitful 
debate on these issues.   
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